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STATE LAW LIMITATIONS ON THE USE
OF INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA
IN CONNECTION WITH ZONING
AMENDMENTS
PETER G. GLENN*
Public willingness to regulate land uses often exceeds public confidence in
local governments as agencies for such regulation.1 Local politicians have
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excellent research assistance of Ms. M. Elizabeth Anania, member of the University of North
Carolina School of Law class of 1977, and Mr. David Leech, member of the University of
North Carolina School of Law class of 1978.
1. For an interesting discussion of public attitudes toward land development, see THE
USE OF LAND 33-73 (W. Reilly ed. 1973). This discussion describes a "new mood" of skepticism
about the benefits of unrestrained growth. Id. at 36. One conclusion offered is that "citizens
are more clear about what they don't want than what they do want." Id. at 41.
Land use regulation is not only a matter of considerable public concern, but is also one in
which the public considers itself to have a fairly high degree of expertise. Richard Babcock, a
knowledgeable and perceptive land use attorney, has observed that:
The layman remains king in land-use matters because he has not feared to grasp the
nettle of land-use regulation. In matters cosmic like unemployment and the disposal of
metropolitan sanitary and industrial waste, the layman as public decision-maker has a
sense of inadequacy or boredom. Not so, however, on the question of who or what
comes in on the lot next door. . . . Imagine the wholesale indifference were you to
poll. . . luncheon guests on their attitude toward a proposed bill to reform the state
criminal laws or the banking code. . . . Try the same test, however, with a proposal
to revise drastically our laws on the control over use of private land and half of the
guests would come off their seats. Not only does this public law have a greater direct
impact upon the layman's social and economic security, but he is certain that he knows
what is good for him as well as any professional.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 19-20 (1966).
Coupled with this high degree of public interest are good reasons for public distrust of local
government decisionmaking:
An understaffed (or nonexistent) planning department, an impecunious applicant, and
some threatened neighbors, all presenting views to public officials who probably must
squeeze their unpaid public service into their spare time, do not add up to a decision-
making process that inspires confidence. And added to that are the common accusa-
tions of incompetence, conflict of interest, and even corruption among the decision-
makers.
THE USE OF LAND, supra at 191.
In too many localities, though, neither the procedures for determining land use
nor the individuals making the decisions have the public's confidence. In any number
of localities, citizens suspect that the people making regulatory decisions are thinking
more about themselves and their cronies than about the general welfare. . . . Unfor-
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demonstrated parochialism,2 favoritism, 3 stupidity,4 and greed5 in regulat-
ing land development. The informality of local zoning decisionmaking often
results in the appearance, if not the reality, of irresponsible government. In
recent years planners have suggested devices for "citizen participation" to
improve the quality of official decisionmaking.6 The most direct forms of
citizen participation in zoning are not, however, the product of modern
planning, but are legacies from the populism of the last century: the
initiative and referendum. 7 The initiative and referendum permit interested
voters to engage in direct legislation, bypassing or overruling their elected
local officials. 8
tunately, the informality that is a virtue of local government can foster these suspi-
cions.
Id. at 213-14.
2. The tendency toward parochialism has been called the "dark side of municipal land
use regulation." Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 193, 336 A.2d 713, 735 (Pashman, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423
U.S. 808 (1975). See also National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
4. But see THE USE OF LAND, supra note 1, at 183-92 (points out the difficulty of the
choices facing local zoning officials). See generally R. BABCOCK, supra note I, at 19.40
(discusses the capability of laymen as public decisionmakers and is especially critical of the lay
planning commission).
5. See, e.g., Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 701-02 (1973) (citing instances of alleged corrup-
tion).
6. See, e.g., D. GODSCHALK, PARTICIPATION, PLANNING, AND EXCHANGE IN OLD AND
NEw COMMUNITIES: A COMPARATIVE PARADIGM 152-59 (1972); Comment, Public Participation in
Local Land-Use Planning: Concepts, Mechanisms, State Guidelines and the Coastal Area
Management Act, 53 N.C.L. REV. 975 (1975); Comment, Michigan's Citizen Participation
Statute, 1970 URB. L. ANN. 231.
7. See Comment, The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 74,
74 n.2 (1976); Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 922, 923 & n.5, 924 (1975).
8. Generally, exercise of the local initiative power requires that a certain percentage of
the voters of the municipality sign and submit to the city governing board a petition accom-
panied by the ordinance drafted by the initiative's sponsors. City government officials are
responsible for determining the legal sufficiency of the petition, including the question of the
number and validity of the signatures. In most instances the city council has the option of either
enacting the proposed legislation or submitting the ordinance to a vote at a special or the next
general election. The ordinance becomes law if it receives a majority of the votes cast at the
election. Some statutes provide for special steps to be taken by the initiative sponsors to inform
the voters about the nature of the proposal. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 4000-4021 (West
Cum. Supp. 1975-1976) (California local initiative procedures).
The local referendum power is exercised pursuant to statutes providing that ordinances
enacted by a city governing body do not become effective for a stated period, usually 30 days.
During this period, a required percentage of the local electorate may submit a petition calling
for the repeal by the governing body of the newly enacted ordinance, or, failing that, submis-
sion of the ordinance to a popular vote at a special or general election. Submission of a valid
petition stays the effective date of the ordinance. The ordinance becomes effective only if it
1978] REZONING BY REFERENDUM OR INITIATIVE 267
In the last decade several lawsuits have challenged the use of direct
legislation devices in making land use decisions. 9 Distrust of local officials
and the desire to preserve a certain quality of life have motivated some
voting publics to use the initiative or the referendum to solve or forestall the
economic, social, or environmental problems associated with shifts in popu-
lation from the farm to the city and from the city to the suburbs.10 Not
surprisingly, those who favor continued urban or suburban growth-land
developers, advocates for the urban poor, and business-oriented local politi-
cians-have challenged the use of the initiative and referendum in the
zoning amendment process.
receives the required percentage of the votes cast in the election. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§ 4050-4061 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976) (California local referendum procedures).
9. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, on remand,
356 N.E.2d 499 (1976) (per curiam) (referendum on zoning amendment to permit apartment
project); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (referendum to approve or disapprove low-
income housing projects); Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976) (zoning amendment to "slow"
the development process enacted by initiative); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (zoning amendment to impose
building height restriction adopted by initiative), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
10. The fact that public opinion on such matters is more readily identified and coalesced
around negative planning ideas, see note I supra, and the fact that the initiative and referendum
procedures require expenditures of time, energy, money, and verbal facility, see note 17 infra,
make it fair to say that, in the context of land use, the direct legislation devices are most
effectively used by residents of relatively homogeneous middle-class communities to prevent
unwanted development-especially development that portends increased size or heterogeneity
of population. The nature of the litigated disputes tends to confirm this conclusion. See, e.g.,
cases cited note 9 supra. See generally Note, The Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning, 29
STAN. L. REV. 819, 825 n.35 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Referenda in Rezoning].
This characteristic of the problem is not often mentioned in the state court opinions. It is
arguable, however, that one of the reasons for refusing to permit direct legislation in making
zoning decisions is that plebiscite decisionmaking is potentially more parochial than ordinary
city council lawmaking. Through the normal processes, "outsiders" are entitled to and do get a
hearing before city governing bodies either directly, see, e.g., Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6
Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972), through a requirement that extramural
needs be considered, see, e.g., Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N. J. 238, 104
A.2d 441 (1954); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N. J. Super. 438,320
A.2d 223 (1974), aff'd as modified, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977), or through the voices of
the land development community, which assertedly has great influence with local officials.
Direct legislation devices can also have a dampening effect on land development generally.
An excellent student note suggests that the referendum has "pragmatic appeal" to advocates of
"no-growth" land development policies. See Referenda in Rezoning, supra at 824. The addition-
al level of decisionmaking imposed by the referendum is thought to make rejection of permis-
sive zoning amendments more likely. Id. at 824-25. The delay, costs, and uncertainty created by
the referendum also decrease the landowners' incentives to propose new developments at all.
Id. at 825, 840-42. These negative effects will obviously be even greater where the referendum
procedure is mandatory rather than optional. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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In resolving these disputes, courts have employed a variety of ap-
proaches. Some courts have disallowed direct legislation in the zoning
amendment context because such procedures conflict with zoning enabling
legislation," violate due process rights of notice and hearing, 12 or invade an
area of "administrative" decisionmaking. 13 In important recent cases, how-
ever, courts have held that the use of the initiative to enact zoning amend-
ments is not invalid because of its inconsistency with the procedural require-
ments of zoning enabling acts, 14 and that the initiative and referendum do
not violate due process. 15
This Article will critically analyze the doctrines of state law that have
been used to decide whether one or both of the direct legislation devices are
appropriately applied to the zoning amendment process. The discussion will
identify characteristics of the zoning amendment process that apparently
have caused courts to reject the use of direct legislation devices in that
context, and will consider which types of zoning amendment decisions are
appropriately subject to legislation consistent with a policy of promoting
intelligent, fair, and responsive decisionmaking. 16
11. See, e.g., Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140,277 P. 308,311 (1929). Hurst
was overruled by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. at 141, 277 P. at 311; Forest City
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S.
668, on remand, 356 N.E.2d 499 (1976) (per curiam).
13. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 472, 221 N.W.2d 303, 3107(1974)
(Levin, J.).
14. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Liver-
more, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 590, 557 P.2d 473, 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 (1976).
15. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976);
San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,217-18, 529 P.2d 570, 577-78,
118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153-54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
16. This Article is not primarily concerned with the parameters or ramifications of the due
process holdings of Eastlake and San Diego. These opinions do not establish a due process
entitlement to the use of direct legislation, but hold only that persons adversely affected by
direct legislation in zoning have not been denied due process in the somewhat unusual contexts
of those cases.
In Eastlake, the United States Supreme Court held that a city charter provision requiring
proposed land use changes to be ratified by referendum did not violate the due process rights of
a landowner who applied for a zoning change. See 426 U.S. at 670-72. The precedential value of
Eastlake may well be limited, however. The majority's opinion was based on the state court's
conclusion that the enactment of zoning provisions is a legislative function. Justice Stevens'
dissent pointed out, however, that where referendum procedures are applied to zoning amend-
ments affecting specific parcels-as arguably was the case in Eastlake-rather than to com-
prehensive zoning ordinances, state courts often hold such use of the referendum to be
inappropriate because the decision actually is administrative rather than legislative. Id. at 690-
92. See generally notes 43-44, 125-29 and accompanying text infra. Assuming arguendo that the
zoning decision was administrative, Justice Stevens argued that the Eastlake conflict would
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I. THE ZONING AMENDMENT PROCESS-
A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW
Evaluation of the doctrines responsive to challenges to zoning amendment
initiatives and referenda requires an understanding of the zoning amendment
process. It may thus be useful to discuss some of the essential characteristics
of that process as it is practiced.
The enactment of a zoning amendment is formally a legislative act
performed by the elected local officials comprising the city council. 17 The
local power to enact and amend zoning ordinances is derived from state
enabling legislation;18 such legislation generally limits the grant of zoning
power by imposing a series of procedural and substantive requirements.
Many enabling acts require, for example, that before a zoning ordinance can
be enacted or amended, the proposal must be reviewed by the planning
board. 19 The planning boards often are required to hold public hearings in
the course of their deliberations. 20 Under some legislation, an unfavorable
simply be between the property owner and his neighbors and would not concern the general
public interest in preserving the city's basic zoning plan. 426 U.S. at 693. As such, Justice
Stevens thought it "essential that the private property owner be given a fair opportunity to have
his claim determined on its merits." Id. at 693-94. In view of the growing tendency of state
courts to treat rezonings as administrative, see notes 125-60 and accompanying text infra, and
the explosion of procedural due process decisions by the Supreme Court following Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a strong argument can be made that Eastlake does not dispose of the
procedural due process problems inherent in zoning referenda. In particular, if the rezoning
involves a specific parcel of land, it should be possible to argue successfully that a referendum
does not adequately protect the due process rights of the affected landowner. See also note 159
infra.
San Diego involved a procedural due process attack on an initiative that imposed a building
height restriction upon an area of the city designated as the coastal zone. The facts of the case
present a very difficult judgment whether to label the decisionmaking "adjudicative," as to
which a notice and hearing requirement would be applicable, or "legislative." See generally
notes 76-78 and accompanying text infra. If an initiative imposed zoning restrictions on a
specific parcel of land smaller than San Diego's coastal zone, however, the above discussion of
Eastlake makes clear that state courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court, might well
hold that such an initiative would violate the due process rights of the affected landowner.
Recent commentary presents quite useful discussions of the Eastlake and San Diego
cases. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 85-89 (1976); Note, Zoning-Adjudication by
Labels: Referendum Rezoning and Due Process, 55 N.C.L. REv. 517 (1977); Referenda in
Rezoning, supra note 10, at 825-31.
17. See D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 64, 66 (1971).
18. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65800-65912 (West 1966).
19. See, e.g., id. §§ 65853, 65857 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55D-64 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 713.10 (Page 1976).
20. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65854 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976); N.Y. GEN. CrrY
LAW § 37 (McKinney 1968).
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judgment by the planning board triggers a requirement that the proposal be
enacted, if at all, by an extraordinary majority of the city council. 2 1
The city council itself generally is required to hold public hearings-
not merely open meetings-when considering a zoning ordinance enactment
or amendment?22 Moreover, when presented with a petition opposing the
amendment signed by a designated number of landowners or residents near
the site to be affected, the city council may be required to act only by an
extraordinary majority. 23
In addition to these procedural requirements, zoning enabling acts
typically contain substantive standards that implicitly require certain types
of deliberations by the council. The most familiar of these requirements is
that enactments be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan.'"24 While its
precise meaning is unclear, the "comprehensive plan" requirement sym-
bolizes the central idea that zoning regimes ought to be based on con-
sideration of a wide variety of public concerns?2
5
The amendment process itself reflects the fact that community planning
is an ongoing process in which the zoning ordinance, one of several tools for
the implementation of a community plan, must be altered to meet changing
needs and perceptions. Ideally, the combined experience of the planning
board, the professional city planning staff, and the city council should
provide historical perspective and realistic vision to ensure that the ongoing
land use regulation process is reasonably related to current as well as future
community needs.2
6
21. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.12 (Page 1976). See also id. § 713.02.
22. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65856 (West 1966); N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW § 83 (McKin-
ney 1968).
23. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-63 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW
§ 83 (McKinney 1968).
24. Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154 (1955);
see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Cum. Supp. 1975-1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62
(West Cum. Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-3 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.63.090
(1965).
25. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW-LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER
§§ 26.10-.20 (1974). See generally id. §§ 20.01-.23; Haar, supra note 24.
State courts in recent years have required local decisionmakers to consider a wide range of
community concerns in making zoning decisions. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J.
Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (1974), aff'd as modified, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
Similar requirements have been imposed by statute. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-2
(West Cum. Supp. 1976).
26. See Referenda in Rezoning, supra note 10, at 842-44.
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The idealized theory stated above is out of touch with much of the
reality of zoning amendment practice. The theory considers zoning ordi-
nance enactment and amendment to be legislative acts. It is common to
think of legislation as the establishment of rules of prospective application to
an open-and usually large--class of potentially affected persons. Zoning
amendment practice differs from this model, however, in two important
respects.
First, by the nature of the subject matter itself, the zoning ordinance
can have an immediate and significant economic impact that is felt primari-
ly, if not exclusively, at the time of enactment by those who own the
affected land. Zoning amendments that expand or restrict development
rights invariably involve a transfer of value, which will be referred to here as
a welfare transfer. When Blackacre is rezoned from a residential to an
industrial classification, its value is enhanced. At the same time, the value
of neighboring Greenacre, an existing residential development, will decline
due to the externalities associated with industrial development. Conversely,
if the homeowners in Greenacre are able to persuade the city council to
downzone Blackacre to an "agricultural" classification, the market value of
Blackacre will decline while Greenacre's is enhanced. Most zoning amend-
ment controversies are therefore three-sided, involving the directly affected
landowner or developer, the city council, and the indirectly affected neigh-
bors. The conflict arises because the directly and indirectly affected land-
owners who can be identified at the time of enactment will either suffer a
"wipeout" or gather a "windfall." '27
Second, the zoning amendment process differs from the legislative
model in that a significant number of zoning amendment decisions are
initiated by private land developers rather than by members of the city
council or planning board. The developer petitions the council for a permis-
sive rezoning of a particular and relatively small parcel of land. Official
consideration of such requests tends to focus on the petitioner's particular
development project rather than on the overall planning needs and criteria of
the community. It is difficult to believe that all of the judicial utterances
27. In these cases, it is generally the neighbors who will avail themselves of the direct
legislation devices. Neighbors are either the potential beneficiaries of a restrictive zoning
change or the self-perceived victims of a permissive amendment. In the first case, the initiative
is likely to be used to achieve the desired benefit through the enactment of a restrictive
amendment; this is sometimes described here as a "downzoning initiative." The second
situation usually arises where a landowner petitions the city council for a permissive amend-
ment as a predicate to particular development project; in what sometimes is termed here a
"permissive amendment referendum," the referendum is used by neighbors to reverse a local
governing board's decision favorable to the prospective developer.
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imaginable about "spot" or "contract" zoning can change this practical
reality. 28
Zoning theory and reality diverge in other ways as well. Zoning and
constitutional theory suggest that the properly enacted zoning ordinance will
establish a class of permitted uses that are economically realistic for the
given set of circumstances. There is evidence, however, that the practice of
many suburban communities is to zone for the purpose of discouraging
rather than permitting land development. 29 Many ordinances attempt to
prevent development as of right by making official approval of development
plans contingent upon particularized, discretionary decisions of the local
governing body. Two mechanisms are readily available for this purpose.
The first is the creation of zones in which relatively few uses are permitted
as of right and in which intensive uses, such as apartment houses, are
permitted only with a special use permit.30 Then, if enabling legislation
permits, the local governing board assumes control of the special use permit
application process. This technique assures the local politicians of discre-
tionary control over a significant portion of the land development process.
The second technique, perhaps more widely used, is to place undeveloped
land in zones that are euphemistically called "limited industrial" or "resi-
dential-agricultural," 31 but which actually are holding zones with use and
specification requirements designed so that no economically motivated
developer can afford to develop in the zone without obtaining a permissive
use or specification amendment to the ordinance. 32
28. See generally 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, §§ 27.01-.08, 29.01-.04 (discusses "spot"
and "contract" zoning). Of course, with good legal advice a city council can learn to avoid the
external indicia of impermissible "spot" or "contract" zoning. For example, Allred v. City of
Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971), can be read as suggesting that city councils should
not keep detailed minutes or records of their consideration of amendments. An alternative and
more sensible reading of Allred and other "spot" or "contract" zoning cases is, however, that
city councils should make a record demonstrating that the legislators have considered appropri-
ate factors in reviewing the zoning amendment proposal. It is possible that a formal process that
forces recorded consideration of appropriate factors will have a beneficial impact on the
subjective approach of individual legislators.
29. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 17, at 61-65 (1971); Krasnowiecki, The Basic System
of Land Use Control: Legislative Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE NEW
ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIvE, AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 3, 6 (N. Marcus
& M. Groves eds. 1970); Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Proce-
dures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1034-35 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458,461,202 S.E.2d
129, 131 (1974) (ordinance permitted construction and operation of automobile service station
only upon grant of special use permit).
31. See, e.g., Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324
N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (land zoned "light industrial" required zoning
change to permit construction of high-rise apartment building).
32. See sources cited note 29 supra.
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When applications for development permission are made in a special
use permit context, the proceedings are generally characterized by review-
ing courts as "quasi-judicial." 3 Even when elected officials make the
decision, they are considered to be acting as administrators rather than as
legislators. The result is that judicial review focuses upon the factfinding
process; the question is whether the "administrators" made an appropriate
decision in applying pre-established statutory standards to the facts on the
record.
On the other hand, when a development proposal is presented to the
governing board in the form of a petition for a zoning amendment, the local
officials wear their "legislative" hats. Council members are cautioned not
to consider the developer's plans to the exclusion of other planning con-
siderations lest they be charged with "spot" or "contract" zoning. Despite
legal theory, however, it is likely that the legislators considering a zoning
amendment are ultimately asking the same question they would ask if the
proceeding were for a special use permit: is the proposed development a
reasonable and desirable addition to the community?
If the petition for a permissive amendment is denied, the developer
seeking judicial review faces a heavy presumption of legislative validity. 34
Conversely, if the permissive amendment is enacted and neighbors bring a
lawsuit charging unlawful "spot" or "contract" zoning, the same presump-
tion of legislative validity will attach to the amendment that would have
attached to its denial. 35 In either case, the focus in the courtroom changes
In his dissent in Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), Justice Hall
said:
Most of the vacant land throughout the township is zoned for industrial use, although
there is none now. This classification seems more a device to block further home
construction on any large scale (as witness the provision permitting dwellings therein
only with approval of the Board of Adjustment) than evidence of any real hope of
filling with industry the areas so zoned.
Id. at 270, 181 A.2d at 150.
33. E.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Board of Aldermen, 284 N.C. 458, 469, 202 S.E.2d
129, 136 (1974).
34. The general understanding is that a developer has no right to a permissive amendment
unless the original zoning designation is invalid. A successful challenge to the validity of the
existing zoning ordinance requires a showing that the ordinance is "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See generally I R.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.23 (2d ed. 1976).
35. See, e.g., Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974)
(majority opinion); Smith v. County of Washington, 241 Or. 380, 406 P.2d 545 (1965) (suit by
neighbors to enjoin permissive rezoning amendment); I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING 27-13 to 27-23 (3d ed. 1974); cf. Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. at
164, 215 N.W.2d at 190 (opinion of Levin, J., concurring); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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from a legislative inquiry into the desirability of the proposed use to a
judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of uses permitted under the current
or amended zoning ordinance. Only rarely will state courts abandon or shift
the presumption of legislative validity and engage in true judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy and accuracy of the city council's factfinding process. 36
Thus, judicial review of zoning amendments often avoids the main
issue-the reasonableness of the proposed development project in terms of
the planning standards of the community. The difficulty lies in the tradition-
al notion that the courts are reviewing exercises of "legislative" power and
that separation of powers therefore dictates a passive judicial stance. Some
courts are recognizing, however, that most zoning amendment disputes
actually involve a conflict over a specific welfare transfer and that the
zoning amendment process, although legislative in form, more closely
resembles administrative action allocating government benefits among a
closed class of particular persons. 37
The facts of the reported zoning initiative and referendum cases suggest
that the direct legislation devices are usually used by voters who perceive
themselves as potential losers in the conflict over a welfare transfer. There
are three basic situations in which resort is made to direct legislation. The
first involves the use of the initiative to effect a partial or systemic reform of
a community's zoning administration.38 For example, the zoning ordinance
might be amended by initiative to require that certain types of planning
criteria be considered explicitly by the council before an amendment is
enacted. The second situation arises when voters use the initiative to impose
use restrictions. 39 In these cases, the proponents of the initiative appear to be
36. E.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, - Colo. -, 542 P.2d 371 (1975); City of Louisville
v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,
507 P.2d 23 (1973). See generally Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Government Law: A Reap-
praisal, 60 MINN. L. REV. 669 (1976); Cunningham, Reflections on Stare Decisis in Michigan:
The Rise and Fall of the "Rezoning as Administrative Act" Doctrine, 75 MICH. L. REV. 983
(1977); Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The
"New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1975); Sullivan, Araby Revisited:
The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 50 (1974); Recent Development, Developments in the Search for Workable
Standards ofJudicialReview of PiecemealRezoning, 24 CAmH. U.L. REV. 294 (1975); Comment,
Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130
(1972).
37. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
38. E.g., Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962).
39. E.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901
(1976).
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using the process to effect a welfare transfer to themselves that the city
council was unwilling to accomplish, perhaps because of the council's lack
of responsiveness to environmental concerns in the community. In the third
situation, the referendum is used to nullify an enacted amendment that
would have permitted intensive development. 4 Here the proponents of the
referendum appear to be employing direct legislation to prevent a welfare
transfer from themselves to a developer.
The effect of using direct legislation in these contexts is to permit
zoning amendment decisions to be made through the electoral process rather
than through the somewhat cumbersome representative process mandated by
the zoning enabling statutes. When faced with challenges to direct legisla-
tion, the courts must make the significant choice between the democratic
values implicit in direct legislation and the goals of careful planning and
individual fairness that are sought, if not always obtained, through the
procedural and substantive requirements of zoning enabling legislation.
II. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON DIRECT LEGISLATION
IN ZONING: THE MAJOR ANALYTIC APPROACHES
Judicial determinations of the validity of the use of initiatives and referenda
in adopting zoning amendments fall into two groups, differentiated by their
predominant modes of analysis. The first group consists of opinions that
compare the direct legislation devices with the pre-enactment procedural
requirements of the zoning enabling statutes, and ask whether the use of
direct legislation to make zoning decisions is consistent with those proce-
dures. 4 ' Some of these opinions are concerned primarily, and more narrow-
40. E.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); West v.
City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (Levin, J.).
41. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968)
(initiative in conflict with zoning procedures); Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826,
323 P.2d 71 (1958) (referendum not inconsistent with statutory zoning procedures), disap-
proved by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976); Hurst v. City of
Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929) (initiative inconsistent with zoning procedures),
overruled by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48; Associated Home Builders of the Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 41 Cal. App. 3d 677, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1974) (initiative
inconsistent with zoning procedures), vacated, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41
(1976); Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973) (initiative
inconsistent with zoning procedures), disapproved by Associated Home Builders of the Great-
er Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 596 n. 14,557 P.2d at 480 n. 14, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 48 n.14; People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1973) (initiative inconsistent with zoning procedures), disapproved by Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d at 596 n.14, 557 P.2d at
480 n. 14, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48 n. 14; Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647
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ly, with the fact that the direct legislation devices, particularly the initiative,
do not provide the equivalent of the notice and hearing required by zoning
enabling acts. Others are concerned with the broader question whether the
use of direct legislation devices might yield results that are substantively
inappropriate because inconsistent with the typical requirement that zoning
ordinances be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' '42 These two
approaches are here referred to collectively as the "compatibility analysis."
Opinions in the second group begin analysis with the commonly ac-
cepted proposition that the initiative and referendum are intended only for
"legislative" decisionmaking.4 3 The opinions then determine-usually
without much discussion-whether there is a basis for ignoring the legisla-
tive form of the amendment and characterizing it as an "administrative"
act. 44 If the amendment is characterized as "administrative," use of direct
(1972) (initiative not in conflict with zoning procedures applicable to charter city); Fletcher v.
Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 313, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962) (initiative not inconsistent with zoning
procedures applicable to charter city); Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187
Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960) (initiative inconsistent with zoning procedures),
disapproved by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d at 596 n.14, 557 P.2d at 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48 n.14; City of Fort Collins v.
Dooney, 178 Colo. 25, 496 P.2d 316 (1972) (referendum not inconsistent with zoning proce-
dures); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737, 202 N.W.2d 803 (1972) (initiative incompat-
ible with zoning procedures); Elliot v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich. App. 363, 175 N.W.2d 821
(1970) (referendum inconsistent with zoning procedures); State ex rel. Wahlman v. Reim, 445
S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1969) (referendum on comprehensive ordinance not inconsistent with zoning
procedures); State ex rel. Powers v. Donohue, 368 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. 1963) (alternative holding)
(initiative inconsistent with zoning procedures); Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J.
Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85, aff'd, 54 N.J. 525, 257 A.2d 698 (1969) (initiative inconsistent with
zoning procedures); Meridian Dev. Co. v. Edison Township, 91 N.J. Super. 310, 220 A.2d 121
(1966) (initiative process supersedes inconsistent zoning procedures); Elkind v. City of New
Rochelle, 5 Misc. 2d 296, 163 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 761, 165 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 836, 155 N.E.2d 404, 181 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958) (referendum inconsistent
with zoning procedures); State ex rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934)
(referendum not inconsistent with zoning procedures); Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d I (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (initiative and referendum inconsistent with zoning procedures); Dewey v.
Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1,277 P.2d 805 (1954) (initiative inconsistent with zoning
procedures).
42. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
43. See notes 125-27 and accompanying text infra.
44. See, e.g., O'Meara v. City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 356 A.2d 906 (1975) (referen-
dum held unavailable when city council acts as a zoning commission rather than in its general
legislative capacity); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (permissive rezoning held "legislative"); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221
N.W.2d 303 (1974) (Levin, J.) (amendment rezoning 150 acres of land held "administrative");
Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972) (permissive rezoning of
approximately 20 acres held "legislative"); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319,75 N.W.2d 713 (1956)
(permissive rezoning held "administrative"); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc.,
89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973) (restrictive amendment to prohibit particular proposed use
held "administrative"); Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164
N.E.2d 180 (1960) (permissive rezoning held "legislative"); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394
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legislation to effect its enactment is prohibited. The approach of these cases
is here referred to as the "characterization analysis."
The classification of an opinion into one of these groups4' is not a
certain guide to the outcome of the litigation. In terms of their results, as
distinct from their methods of analysis, the cases fall into three categories.
Cases in the first category would permit, at least implicitly, the use of either
the initiative or referendum in connection with zoning amendments; these
decisions might be supported by either a compatibility or characterization
approach. 46 The second category of decisions would permit use of the
referendum but not the initiative;4 7 these cases are most likely to be support-
ed by a compatibility analysis. The third category of cases includes deci-
sions holding that neither the initiative nor the referendum is available in
connection with zoning amendments; these cases are usually supported by
either a characterization analysis or the broader compatibility analysis that
concerns itself with the requirement of comprehensiveness.
48
A. CoMPATIBILY ANALYSIS
1. The California Decisions
Any discussion of compatibility analysis should begin with Hurst v. City of
Burlingame.49 Hurst was the first in a line of decisions in California and
other states holding that the initiative is incompatible with the zoning
amendment process because it fails to comply with the statutorily required
P.2d 808 (1964) (permissive rezoning held "administrative"); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87
Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (rezoning 141-acre tract held quasi-judicial).
45. A case may fall into both the compatibility and characterization categories; a court
that characterizes zoning decisionmaking as "legislative" may then proceed to a compatibility
analysis. See, e.g., Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972); State ex
rel. Hunzicker v. Pulliam, 168 Okla. 632, 37 P.2d 417 (1934).
46. See, e.g., Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972) (compati-
bility analysis) (initiative explicitly permitted); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202
N.W.2d 892 (1972) (characterization analysis) (referendum explicitly permitted).
47. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958) (compati-
bility analysis) (referendum permitted), disapproved by Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,596 n. 14, 557 P.2d 473,480 n. 14, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737, 202 N.W.2d 803 (1972)
(compatibility analysis) (referendum permitted, but initiative prohibited).
48. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (Levin, J.)
(characterization analysis) (referendum not permitted); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125
N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973) (broad compatibility analysis) (referendum not permitted);
Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (broad compatibility analysis) (neither
referendum nor initiative permitted).
49. 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929), overruled by Associated Home Builders of the Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473,480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48
(1976).
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pre-enactment hearing procedures, considered essential for the enactment of
valid zoning ordinances.
The controversy in Hurst arose after the voters of Burlingame enacted
a comprehensive zoning ordinance by initiative. According to the court,
"factional differences" had developed in the city over the implementation
of a zoning regime.50 Each of two citizen groups prepared and presented to
the city council a comprehensive zoning plan and an initiative petition. The
city council declined to act on either plan and placed both proposed ordi-
nances on the ballot. The ordinance adopted in the initiative election placed
Hurst's land in an exclusively residential zone. Hurst objected and sued to
invalidate the ordinance. The California Supreme Court agreed that the
ordinance had been adopted improperly.51
The court based its decision on the principle that the scope of the local
initiative is coextensive with the power of the local legislative body.5 2 The
California Zoning Act of 1917 gave general-law cities such as Burlingame
the power to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances, but required the local
legislative body to hold a public hearing on a tentative zoning plan, develop
a final plan, and, before enacting the final plan, hold yet another public
hearing.5 3 The court reasoned that the zoning power of the Burlingame city
council was derived from the Zoning Act and was therefore circumscribed
by the procedural requirements of the Act.5 4
The court concluded that the Zoning Act's notice and hearing require-
ments should not be disregarded, and asserted that the requisite notice and
hearing could not be met in an initiative election.55 Therefore, the court held
50. Id. at 140, 277 P. at 311.
51. For 6 years prior to adoption of the ordinance, plaintiff had used his land as a storage
yard for a lumber and building materials supply business. The lawsuit was brought when city
officials threatened to enforce the exclusive residential zoning designation. Id. at 136-37, 277 P.
at 310.
52. Id. at 140, 277 P. at 311.
53. Zoning Act of 1917, 1917 Cal. Stats. 1419, 1419-21.
54. According to the court: "[W]hen the method for the exercise of the power is pre-
scribed by the statute such method is the measure of the power to act." 207 Cal. at 141,277 P. at
311.
55. Id. It is somewhat surprising that the court did not make a greater effort to reconcile
the initiative process with the notice and hearing requirements of the Zoning Act. A central
principle of the law of direct legislation devices is that these powers should be broadly
construed. See Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 1717, 1724 & n.43 (1966). This would especially seem to be true in a state such as
California where the powers of local initiative and referendum are reserved to the people in the
state constitution. This interpretation was finally adopted by the court in Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 594-96,557 P.2d 473,
479-80, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47-48 (1976).
If the Hurst court had perceived the function of the notice and hearing requirements to be
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that "[tihe initiative law and the zoning law are hopelessly inconsistent and
in conflict as to the manner of the preparation and adoption of a zoning
ordinance.''56 Faced with this conflict, the court concluded that the initia-
tive-'"general in its scope"- should be subordinated to the special and
"particular" Zoning Act. 57
The court buttressed this statutory conflict rationale with a sentence
suggesting a due process basis for its holding:
When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible
effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the
legislative body becomes quasi judicial in character and the statu-
tory notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy
the requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with. 58
Hurst can therefore be read as resting upon two related bases for
decision. The first is the statutory procedural limitation on city legislative
power that was said to conflict with and override the general initiative
process. The second is the circular argument that the notice and hearing
requirements of the statute make the process "quasi judicial" and that this
characterization triggers a due process requirement of notice and hearing.
that of providing the decisionmaker with access to facts and public opinion, it might have
concluded that the election campaign in the initiative process would substantially accomplish
that purpose. This would have been a reasonable means of accommodating the statutory
requirements of notice and hearing with the constitutionally reserved power of the initiative.
The court chose, however, to characterize the notice and hearing requirements as having a
constitutional dimension. See text accompanying note 58 infra. The conflict was perceived as
being between two constitutionally mandated values, and the court chose to subordinate the
right of initiative to the hearing and notice provisions that it said were required by due process.
Even this choice was not inevitable. The court might have concluded that, because judicial
review of the application of a zoning ordinance to particular property was available to the
landowner, the initiative process would not preclude an adjudicatory hearing prior to any
permanent loss in property value.
Later, the California Court of Appeal strongly rejected the idea that an initiative election
might serve as a substitute for the zoning pre-enactment procedures, but on different grounds.
Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 63-65, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214, 227 (1973), disapproved
by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
596 n. 14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n. 14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976); see text accompanying notes
73-74 infra.
56. 207 Cal. at 141, 277 P. at 311.
57. Id.
58. Id. Note that the court supported its due process argument with a characterization of
the rezoning process as "quasi judicial." Cases classified in this Article as "characterization"
analysis opinions proceed from the "quasi judicial" characterization directly to a conclusion
that direct legislation is improper because the initiative and referendum are reserved for
"legislative" matters; reference to the absence of notice and hearing is not essential to this
rationale. See notes 125-60 and accompanying text infra.
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Later California cases involved litigants who sought to avoid the
holding of Hurst. One of the most interesting of these cases is Laguna
Beach Taxpayers' Association v. City Council.5 9 Plaintiff, a citizen's
group, sought a writ of mandate to compel city officials either to adopt
certain ordinances or else to submit them to the voters in an initiative
election. One of the ordinances would have required the city council to
adopt an architectural policy; another would have prohibited the city plan-
ning commission from granting specification variances for the construction
of buildings in excess of fifty feet in height.6W
Plaintiff attempted to distinguish Hurst by arguing that the proposed
zoning ordinances were mere statements of general policy; implementation
of the policy would require additional governmental action. Plaintiff ar-
gued that the city's power to articulate general policy was not limited by the
"restrictive method of adoption" required for specific zoning ordinance
changes.61 The thrust of plaintiff's argument was that the ordinance in Hurst
not only stated policy, but also directly imposed use restrictions on land in
the community.
Plaintiff claimed support for its position in the amended state zoning
enabling act,62 which provided that "except as otherwise provided" in the
zoning article, amendments to zoning ordinances could be initiated and
adopted as are "other ordinances.' '63 Presumably "other ordinances" could
be adopted by initiative. The zoning article required any amendment that
"imposes," "removes," or "modifies" a zoning regulation to be adopted
only after the notice and hearing ordinarily required for the adoption of an
original zoning ordinance.64 On the face of these provisions, the Hurst
notice and hearing rationale would not seem to apply to the proposed
Laguna Beach amendments.6 5
59. 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960), disapproved by Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596 n. 14, 557 P.2d
473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976).
60. Id. at 413, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
61. Id. at 415, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
62. Id. at 417-18, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 779; see notes 63-65 infra.
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65807 (1953), recodified at CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65853 (West 1966).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65853 (West 1966).
65. Hurst depended upon the assertion that the power of the electorate in direct legislation
was coextensive with the power of the city council, which was limited by the procedural
requirements set forth in the statute. When Hurst was decided, the Zoning Act required a
noticed hearing in connection with all zoning ordinance amendments. When Laguna Beach was
decided, however, the notice and hearing requirements of the Zoning Act were limited to
situations in which the amendment directly imposed, removed, or modified a land use regula-
tion. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. Plaintiff argued that the propoged amendments
in Laguna Beach were concerned with general policy and would not have directly imposed,
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The court of appeal rejected plaintiff's arguments. The court said that
the implementation of an architectural policy might involve the imposition
of zoning regulations.66 From this premise, the court concluded that an
ordinance requiring the establishment of an architectural policy could be
enacted only after notice and hearing. 67 The Hurst rationale would therefore
prohibit enactment by initiative. As to the ordinance restricting the power of
the planning commission to grant height variances, the court's response was
abrupt. The proposed ordinance, it said, "regulates the height of buildings
by prescribing a maximum height therefor." 68
Laguna Beach was wrongly decided. Neither of the proposed ordi-
nances would have "imposed," "removed," or "modified" a land use
regulation. The restriction on variances did not prescribe a maximum
height; that prescription was already contained in the zoning ordinance.
Since the ordinance requiring formulation of an architectural policy did not
directly affect any zoning regulation, there was no necessary incompatibility
between the zoning statute and the initiative process. Nor did Hurst compel
the court to bar the policy-oriented Laguna Beach initiatives since Hurst
involved the initial adoption of a zoning ordinance that actually imposed
land use regulations.
Laguna Beach therefore represents, at the least, a missed opportunity
for a narrow and sensible reading of Hurst. At worst, the opinion is an
unwarranted extension of Hurst in the face of new statutory language that
seems to permit the use of the initiative for adopting prospective statements
of policy not coupled to direct implementation.
In 1965, however, the California zoning laws were amended in a way
that might have completely destroyed the statutory basis for Hurst.69 The
removed, or modified existing rules regarding land use. The city council would therefore have
been empowered to enact them without notice and hearing and, on the reasoning of Hurst, the
initiative would not have been an incompatible means of enactment.
66. The court described the proposal as establishing "a policy that all future buildings in
the city should conform to a type of architecture to be adopted and enforced through appropri-
ate legislation." 187 Cal. App. 2d at 415, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78.
67. The court stated that both the proposed architectural policy and the limitation on
height variances "involve subjects of regulation" described in the Zoning Act and were
therefore required to be enacted, if at all, only after pre-enactment notice and hearing. Id. at
418, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 779. The court's language-"involve subjects of regulation"-is signifi-
cantly different from the language of then § 65804 of the Zoning Act- "imposes," "removes,"9
"modifies." See note 64 and accompanying text supra. If read broadly, the Laguna Beach
court's approach would preclude use of the initiative in enacting proposals dealing with any
subject traditionally associated with zoning regulations, no matter how indirect the impact of
the proposed legislation.
68. 187 Cal. App. 2d at 417, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
69. See 1965 Cal. Stats. 4334, 4334-50.
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1965 amendments did not change the requirement that amendments impos-
ing, removing, or modifying zoning regulations be adopted after notice and
hearing. Significantly, however, a section was added to the statute instruct-
ing courts not to invalidate zoning measures for procedural deficiencies not
"prejudicial. "70 Other newly added language expressly stated the legisla-
ture's intention to provide "only a minimum of limitation" over local
zoning matters.71
Subsequent to these amendments, the voters of Laguna Beach adopted
a building height restriction by initiative. The affected landowners filed a
lawsuit asserting that the amendment was invalid under Hurst. In Taschner
v. City Council,72 the court of appeal invalidated the initiative in spite of the
1965 amendments73 and breathed new life into Hurst by emphasizing its due
process dictum.
The question before the court in Taschner was whether the initiative
satisfied the requirement for notice and hearing and, if not, whether any
defect was "prejudicial." The Taschner court's response differed from the
Hurst court's narrow focus on the public hearing requirement; it specifically
rejected the argument that the initiative might provide the substantial equiv-
alent of the required zoning procedures. The court asserted that the amount
and quality of debate found in the election process could not be equated with
the "dispassionate study, evaluation and report" elicited by the required
steps of normal zoning enactment. 74 The Taschner court also voiced its
belief that the "legitimate claims" of affected landowners, perhaps a small
percentage of the electorate, are better considered by the city legislative
70. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65801 (West 1966) (enacted by 1965 Cal. Stats. 4334, 4346). The
new section essentially provides that zoning decisions should not be judicially invalidated for
procedural deficiencies unless the defect was prejudicial. No similar language appeared in the
Zoning Act when the zoning ordinance at issue in Hurst was enacted. Although the 1965
amendments did not expressly address the availability of the initiative, § 65801 suggests that
substantial compliance with the procedural requirements, including the notice and hearing
requirements, is satisfactory. A court, therefore, might reasonably conclude that the character-
istics of an election campaign bring about substantial compliance with the requirement for a
public hearing, so that an initiative would not be in irreconcilable conflict with the zoning
statute procedural requirements.
71. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65800 (West 1966) (enacted by 1965 Cal. Stats. 4334, 4346)
(amended by 1970 Cal. Stats. 3310, 3313).
72. 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973), disapproved by Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d
473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976).
73. The Taschner court conceded that the effect of the 1965 amendments was that local
zoning power derived not from the zoning statute, but from the broad grant of police power in
the state constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7. The court, however, still interpreted the
amended zoning statute as establishing minimum standards for zoning procedure. 31 Cal. App.
3d at 62-63, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
74. Id. at 64, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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bodies. 75 The opinion therefore states a broader basis for invalidating the use
of the initiative than the Hurst compatibility rationale, which is based
exclusively on the absence of a public hearing.
In 1974, the California Supreme Court disposed of the idea that Hurst
was based on a due process rationale. In San Diego Building Contractors
Association v. City Council,76 the court was presented with an explicit
procedural due process attack on an initiative adopting a building height
restriction applicable to San Diego's coastal zone. Plaintiffs argued that,
because the new ordinance applied only to a limited section of the city and
placed a significant economic burden on the affected landowners, the action
was adjudicative rather than legislative. Plaintiffs therefore claimed that the
notice and hearing requirements of procedural due process were applicable
and that, because the initiative process does not provide opportunity for
formal hearings, the initiative was invalid.
The San Diego court rejected plaintiffs' arguments. The central pro-
position of Justice Tobriner's majority opinion is that due process does not
require procedural safeguards for the enactment of legislation even though
such safeguards are required for the adjudication of disputes. 77 Moreover,
the due process language in Hurst was correctly viewed as dictum and
expressly disapproved.
78
After San Diego's rejection of the due process dictum in Hurst, the
way was left open for a straightforward attack on Hurst's statutory compati-
bility rationale. That attack was successfully made in Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore.79 Livermore
voters had adopted a growth control ordinance by initiative.8" The trial court
75. Id.
76. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901
(1976).
77. Id. at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
78. Justice Tobriner's opinion explained that:
[Tihe Hurst decision rests exclusively on a matter of statutory interpretation; its
holding does not rely on constitutional principles at all .... [The Hurst language]
states only that notice and a hearing are necessary when required by statute and
implicitly supports the constitutional principle reviewed above by suggesting rather
clearly that when there is no such statutory requirement the adoption of a general
zoning law remains a legislative act, as to which due process does not require notice
and hearing.
Id. at 216, 529 P.2d at 576, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 152 (emphasis in original).
79. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
80. For a discussion of the background of this initiative and its attendant litigation, see
Deutsch, Land Use Growth Controls: A Case Study of San Jose and Livermore, California, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 1 (1974).
The text of the Livermore initiative is set forth in the Associated Home Builders opinion.
18 Cal. 3d at 589 n.2, 557 P.2d at 476 n.2, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.2. The ordinance is crudely
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invalidated the initiative on the authority of Hurst. The court of appeal
affirmed in a rather confusing opinion that ultimately relied on the due
process language of Hurst, although the court also held that the Livermore
initiative was a "zoning ordinance" subject to the statutory pre-enactment
procedures. 81
When Associated Home Builders reached the California Supreme
Court, only Justice Clark was unwilling to overrule Hurst.82 Justice Tobrin-
er's majority opinion stated forthrightly that "Hurst . . .was incorrectly
decided and is therefore overruled. '"83 Justice Tobriner's approach is sim-
drawn. It would appear, however, to have the effect of directly implementing growth control by
eliminating residences as permitted uses for a period of time necessary for the city to find
solutions to such municipal problems as overcrowded schools, inadequate sewage facilities,
and an insufficient water supply. Id. Although the ordinance did not expressly require that such
problems be solved at all, it was held to be valid. Cf. Golden v. Town Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359,
285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (comprehensive
zoning ordinance conditioning residential development upon the availability of adequate
municipal facilities held valid).
81. 41 Cal. App. 3d 677, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1974), vacated, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
The court of appeal in Associated Home Builders relied upon both Laguna Beach and
Taschner. Laguna Beach was cited for the proposition that the proposed Livermore growth
control ordinance was in fact a "zoning ordinance" subject to the statutory notice and hearing
requirements and, therefore, to the statutory conflict rationale of Hurst. This conclusion
probably was correct because the Livermore ordinance did directly impose use restrictions.
The court reached that conclusion, however, without independently analyzing either the Liver-
more ordinance or the Laguna Beach holding. The court relied on People's Lobby, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973), and Scott v. City of Indian
Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972), for the proposition that due
process requires notice and hearing before the adoption of any measure interfering with land
use. San Diego, decided after the court of appeal's decision in Associated Home Builders,
rejected this proposition. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
82. Although Justice Mosk dissented, he agreed that "[t]he Hurst doctrine has long
outlived its usefulness; it should no longer hobble the initiative process." 18 Cal. 3d. at 616, 557
P.2d at 493, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
Because of many conceptual difficulties raised by Hurst, see note 98 infra, it had appeared
as early as 1972 in the California Court of Appeal's decision in Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App.
3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972), that Hurst might be of limited precedential value. The Bayless
court indicated in a footnote that the 1965 enactment of Government Code § 65801 might have
abrogated the statutory conflict rationale of Hurst. Id. at 469 n.5, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 650 n.5. That
section provides, in essence, that zoning enactments should not be invalidated for nonprejudi-
cial procedural defects. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65801 (West 1966). See generally note 70 and
accompanying text supra. The Bayless court also indirectly called into question the due process
rationale of Hurst by holding that "the initiative process does not have to conform to the notice
and hearing requirements which obtain when such ordinances are enacted by a city council." 26
Cal. App. 3d at 469, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 650. The California Supreme Court denied a petition for a
hearing in Bayless. Id. at 470, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 651 (McComb, Peters, and Burke, JJ.,
dissenting). Thus, it is arguable that a majority of the supreme court approved of language in
Bayless that was intended to limit Hurst.
83. 18 Cal.'3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
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ple: Hurst was wrong because the legislature never intended the zoning pre-
enactment procedures to apply to zoning initiatives.84 Moreover, Justice
Tobriner stated that since the right to the initiative is guaranteed to the
people by the state constitution, using the provisions of the state zoning law
to bar use of the initiative might well be unconstitutional. 85 Justice Tobriner
avoided that result by interpreting the zoning statute procedures as inapplic-
able to zoning initiatives.86
The breadth of the court's holding in Associated Home Builders is
surprising. By concluding that the California zoning procedures do not
apply to initiative action,8 7 and by suggesting that the legislature may not
impose any limits on the use of the-initiative in zoning ordinance enactment
or amendment,88 the court appears to have discarded the compatibility
analysis as a doctrinal limitation on direct legislation in California zoning.
If the court had been willing to wrestle with the difficult question
whether the Livermore initiative "imposes" zoning regulations, 89 however,
it might have modified the Hurst incompatibility rationale to conform to the
current zoning act, which requires pre-enactment notice and hearing only
where the ordinance "imposes," "removes," or "modifies" a regula-
tion. 90 Such a result would have retained the essence of Hurst's concern for
fairness in zoning by barring the use of direct legislation in enacting
directly applicable zoning regulations, but would still have permitted direct
legislation to be used in adopting zoning policy. As it stands, Associated
Home Builders represents a judicial preference for the policies underlying
direct legislation over the policies underlying the special zoning pre-enact-
ment procedures. What is not clear is whether this preference is either
desirable or required by the California Constitution.
84. The Legislature plainly drafted the questioned provisions of the zoning law with a
view to ordinances adopted by vote of the city council; the provisions merely add
certain additional procedural requirements to those already specified in Government
Code sections 36931-36939 for the enactment of ordinances in general.
Id. at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
85. Id. at 595, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
86. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
87. 18 Cal. 3d at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
88. Id. at 595, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
89. Because the Livermore ordinance imposes a moratorium on residential construction,
see note 80 supra, it ought to be interpreted as "imposing" a use restriction on land where
residential uses were previously permitted as of right. Because the restriction is not permanent,
however, and because it has city-wide application, it could perhaps be argued that the Liver-
more ordinance constitutes a statement of zoning policy to which the notice and hearing
requirements for ordinances "imposing" regulations are not applicable.
90. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
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A major difficulty with the use of direct legislation to impose zoning
regulations is that the electors are often either poorly informed or insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the competing policy considerations involved in impos-
ing substantial economic burdens on a small number of landowners. 9 1
Regardless of whether due process requires informed decisionmaking, per-
mitting direct legislation when the electorate is not properly informed is
inconsistent with the general desire for fairness implicit in the pre-enactment
procedures of most zoning statutes, including that of California.
Such use of direct legislation is also inconsistent with the general
tradition that direct legislation is reserved for the enactment of legislation.
92
The California Constitution vests the "legislative power" of the state in the
legislature, but reserves the powers of the initiative and referendum to the
people. 93 The initiative is defined as "the power of the electors to propose
statutes. . . and to adopt or reject them." 94 The referendum is defined as
"the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes." 9 5 Thus, the direct
legislation devices appear to be intended for use in "legislative" rather than
"administrative" decisions. Nothing in Associated Home Builders fore-
closes the argument that the initiative and referendum should be unavailable
where the zoning decision is characterized as "quasi-judicial" or "adminis-
trative";96 moreover, such an approach to the problem is consistent with the
California Constitution's initiative and referendum provisions. 97
Hurst should not be mourned, however. Hurst's lack of clarity had
91. Mr. Jonathan S. Paris of the Stanford Law Review conducted a survey of voters in
Eastlake, Ohio regarding the referendum in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,
426 U.S. 668 (1976). See Referenda in Rezoning, supra note 10, at 829 n.62, 832 n.80. The
questionnaire was distributed 4 years after the referendum; very few voters responded, and the
survey is therefore inconclusive. The results, however, tend to support the proposition that a
direct election campaign is not an adequate substitute for the public hearing required by zoning
enabling legislation. Ninety percent of the respondents did not know the size of the parcel to be
rezoned or the number of apartment units proposed for the project. Id. at 832 n.80. Although
the project was to build housing for the elderly, 90% of the respondents either did not know
whether the project would increase school population or thought the increase would be signifi-
cant. Id. at 829 n.62. It is difficult to believe that the Eastlake City Council-which voted to
rezone-was so ignorant, or that the interested voters would have been so ignorant if they had
been present at a public hearing on the proposal.
92. See notes 125-29 and accompanying text infra.
93. CAL. CONsT. art. 4, § 1 (1849, amended 1966).
94. Id. art. 2, § 8 (1849, amended 1976).
95. Id. art. 2, § 9 (1849, amended 1976).
96. This is the approach taken by courts employing the characterization analysis. See
generally notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra; notes 125-29 and accompanying text in fra.
97. Cf. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (Levin, J.) (limiting
the use of direct legislation in Michigan to "legislative" matters on the basis of an evaluation of
state constitutional and legislative history).
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spawned a number of problems that had plagued the California courts. 98 By
eliminating Hurst, the court has now fashioned a doctrine that arguably
leaves open the possibility of limiting direct legislation in zoning through a
characterization analysis.
99
2. The Non-California Compatibility Opinions
The demise of Hurst in California probably will have little impact on the
development of compatibility theory in other states, even where courts have
98. One problem raised by Hurst is a possible distinction in the treatment to be accorded
initiatives as opposed to referenda. In Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d
71 (1958), disapproved by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976),
the California Supreme Court confirmed a suggestion made in Hurst that the initiative and
referendum should be treated differently. Johnston involved an attack on the validity of a
referendum; the Johnston court upheld the validity of the referendum because the procedural
steps required for the enactment of zoning ordinances had been taken by the local legislative
body prior to subjecting the ordinance to the referendum procedure. See 49 Cal. 2d at 836-37,
323 P.2d at 77. The court pointed out that the initiative is distinguishable from the referendum
because an initiative is adopted without such compliance with the zoning statute procedures;
the initiative in Hurst was void for that reason. Id. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
When considered from the standpoint of the quality of the zoning process, however, a
distinction between the initiative and referendum is difficult to justify. The initiative and
referendum both place the operative decisionmaking power in the hands of the electorate, some
of whom stand to benefit from the resulting welfare transfer. Since interested neighbors may
upset a zoning change approved by both the city council and the planning board, use of the
referendum poses a significant threat to the comprehensiveness of the zoning process. See text
accompanying notes 113-14 infra.
Hurst's rationale also permitted a dichotomy between general-law and charter cities that
was intellectually unsatisfactory. Charter cities did not derive zoning power from the enabling
act and thus were not subject to the procedural requirements of state law. See San Diego Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 529 P.2d 570, 576, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146,
152 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976). This distinction is difficult to justify,
however, if, as the Hurst due process dictum suggests, the policy underlying the incompatibili-
ty limitation is the protection of individuals' rights to notice and hearing. Certainly those rights
are important regardless of whether the affected landowner resides in a charter or a general-law
city.
Moreover, Hurst's reliance on the language and purpose of the Zoning Act left its rationale
vulnerable to amendments to the Act. See generally notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra.
Reliance on the statute also resulted in pressure to apply Hurst's doctrinal limitation in
situations where the protection of the rights of individuals by notice and hearing is inapposite;
this difficulty arose because the Zoning Act at the time of Hurst did not distinguish between
different types of zoning amendments. An example of such pressure is Laguna Beach, where
an initiative that arguably would not have restricted individuals' rights by directly imposing land
use regulations was nevertheless disallowed. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text supra.
Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal. App. 2d 213, 21 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1962), is a more sensitive response
to the statutory language although the Zoning Act is not directly applicable because the city,
Palo Alto, is a charter city. Fletcher upheld an initiative to redefine the duties of the city
planning commission with regard to adoption of a master plan. Justice Tobriner, sitting by
designation in Fletcher, distinguished Laguna Beach on the ground that "the ordinance here
does not provide for future permanent zoning but establishes a temporary protection against
interim changes in zoning." 203 Cal. App. 2d at 324, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
99. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
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explicitly followed Hurst.1° ° Some courts that followed Hurst..at one time
have now rejected its approach in favor of a characterization analysis. °0
Other courts that purport to follow Hurst actually articulate their opinions in
terms of a broader compatibility approach that differs markedly from
Hurst's narrow focus on the notice and hearing questions.
City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court'0 2 is a good example of an opinion
that cites Hurst but that ultimately uses a broader compatibility analysis. In
Scottsdale, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the initiative is not avail-
able to voters who seek to overturn a permissive amendment adopted by the
city council.' 0 3 The court stated that the power to zone had been delegated
by the legislature exclusively to the "governing body of the city." 104 The
court then cited the "well-established general rule" that when the legisla-
ture makes a grant of power and prescribes the manner of its exercise, the
power must not be exercised otherwise than as prescribed. 105 Because both
the state zoning statute and the city ordinance required a public hearing for
the enactment of zoning amendments, the initiative process is not a permis-
sible means of enacting such amendments. The opinion suggests that the
initiative violates due process in this context by not providing a hearing. 106
The Arizona court's citations in support of this conclusion suggest,
however, that due process might be offended not by the lack of a hearing, as
in Hurst, but by the city council's abdication of its delegated power to make
zoning amendments. 1 Implicit in the Scottsdale court's opinion is the
100. Hurst has frequently been cited by courts refusing to allow direct legislation in the
zoning context. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290
(1968); Korash v. City of Livonia, 388 Mich. 737,202 N.W.2d 803 (1972); Smith v. Township of
Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85, aff'd per curiam, 54 N.J. 525, 257 A.2d 698
(1969); Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty
Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954).
101. Compare West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (Levin, J.)
and Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964) with Korash v. City of Livonia, 388
Mich. 737, 202 N.W.2d 803 (1972) and Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277
P.2d 805 (1954). For a discussion of characterization analysis, see notes 43-44 supra; notes 125-
29 infra.
102. 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290 (1968).
103. Id. at 207, 439 P.2d at 293.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. The court cited Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), and Washington ex
rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). These cases disallowed delegation
of municipal decisionmaking power to a city's citizens. The Arizona Court's opinion is some-
what curious, however, since it does not discuss the application of either Eubank or Roberge to
the facts of the case. Hurst is cited, but Hurst itself cited neither Eubank nor Roberge; further,
the Hurst language does not indicate a concern for problems of delegation of power to citizens
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notion that the legislature's delegation of the power to zone to the governing
body of the city was intended to be exclusive. While Hurst focused upon the
procedural protections afforded the landowner by a notice and hearing
requirement, this exclusive delegation approach emphasizes the power of
the pre-enactment procedures to promote comprehensive and reasoned plan-
ning implementation by the governing body of the city.108
Hancock v. Rouse ,19 a Texas opinion, illustrates the appeal the exclu-
sive delegation approach has for some state courts. Plaintiffs sought to
compel the submission of a downzoning initiative to the voters. The court
noted that the statute granted zoning power to the "local legislative
body." ' i10 This language would seem to support use of the initiative if the
"legislative power" is shared by the electors and the representative govern-
ing body. The court pointed out, however, that the statute required: (1) that
zoning be in accordance with a "comprehensive plan," (2) that both the city
council and a specialized zoning commission be involved in the process, (3)
that public hearings be held before both the zoning commission and the city
council, and (4) that the interests of affected neighbors be protected by
requirement of receipt of actual notice of the proposed amendments and by
imposition of a three-fourths majority vote requirement on the city council
upon presentation of the neighbors' protest petition.111
The Hancock court concluded that these special procedures reflected a
legislative intention that zoning decisions be something more than a series of
ad hoc political choices. It emphasized that the intelligent preparation and
adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance requires "careful study,"
detailed informational input, and the advice of experienced professionals.
The court expressed its belief that the electoral process cannot provide an
adequate substitute for the procedural steps required by the zoning statute. 11 2
Both Scottsdale and Hancock suggest that a more important question
than whether the initiative conflicts with the zoning notice and hearing
requirements is whether some zoning decisions are inherently unsuited to
plebiscite decisionmaking. This question of suitability is most directly
presented in the compatibility analysis cases dealing with referenda. Some
of these cases simply avoid the issue by concluding that the compatibility
except to the extent that delegation to the electorate results in failure to provide notice and
hearing.
108. The exclusive delegation approach is similar to the broader compatibility analysis used
in Taschner. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
109. 437 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 4.
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doctrine of Hurst only examines the relationship between direct legislation
and the pre-enactment zoning procedures; the referendum is said to be a
post-enactment procedure to which pre-enactment procedures simply do not
apply. 11
3
If the problem is considered from the standpoint of the ituality of the
zoning process rather than from the perspective of protecting the affected
landowner's rights, however, differences between the referendum and the
initiative become less compelling. Both the initiative and referendum re-
move the operative decisionmaking power from the governing body and
planning board and place it instead into the hands of the electorate-some of
whom will be beneficiaries of the resulting welfare transfer. Moreover, use
of the referendum permits the interested neighbors to upset a zoning change
that has been approved by the planning board and possibly by an extraordi-
nary majority of the governing board. Thus, the use of the referendum on
permissive rezoning may pose a significant threat to the comprehensiveness
of the zoning process.
This concern with the quality of zoning decisions is reflected in some
of the zoning referendum cases. In Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 114 the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court considered actions by
two municipalities seeking a declaratory judgment that the referendum was
inapplicable to permissive zoning amendments. The New Jersey court
recognized that the competing values involved were the comprehensiveness
of zoning planned and adopted by experienced city officials versus the
benefits of wider public participation in the management of municipal
affairs. 115
The Spillane court's examination of New Jersey precedent convinced it
that the philosophy of comprehensive zoning should prevail over that of
direct public participation. 116 The court noted that effective, comprehensive
zoning requires consideration of a variety of social, economic, and geo-
graphic factors in connection with the present and future needs of the
113. E.g., Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958), disapproved
by Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976). See note 98 supra.
114. 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).
115. Id. at 524, 312 A.2d at 156.
116. Zoning is intended to be accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive plan
and should reflect both present and prospective needs of the community. [citations
omitted] Among other things, the social, economic and physical characteristics of the
community should be considered. The achievement of these goals might well bejeopardized by piecemeal attacks on the zoning ordinances if referenda were permiss-
ible for review of any amendment.
Id. at 525-26, 312 A.2d at 157.
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community. Although not explicit in the opinion, it is a fair inference that
the court found this consideration of factors-and the inevitable balancing
of interests-to be beyond the capacity of the electorate in referenda on
specific issues: "Sporadic attacks on a municipality's comprehensive plan
would tend to fragment zoning without any overriding concept." 
17
Cynics or realists might scoff at the suggestion that a typical municipal
governing body regulates in terms of any "overriding concept" other than
expediency or parochialism. The Spillane court recognized, however, that
"governing bodies may not always have acted in the best interest of the
public and may not, in every case, have demonstrated the expertise which
they might be expected to develop." 11 8 The important point here is that the
direct legislation cure may be worse than the disease. At least the caprice of
a city council can be made amenable to effective judicial review; the
whimsy of a voting public may be exceptionally difficult to monitor.
119
In Elkind v. City of New Rochelle,120 a New York court refused to
permit a referendum to be used for a zoning ordinance amendment. The
court argued that the comprehensiveness of a well-considered zoning plan
might be destroyed if certain provisions could be rejected through the
referendum. The Elkind court specifically expressed its fear that
"[e]ssential uses, such as for churches and schools, could be barred from
the municipalities." 12 1
117. Id. at 526, 312 A.2d at 157.
In 1976, the New Jersey legislature adopted a statute prohibiting referenda or initiatives on
zoning ordinances or amendments. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55 D-62 (West Cum. Supp. 1976). This
statute reflects the legislature's preference for the result in Spillane and Smith v. Township of
Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 256 A.2d 85, aff'd, 54 N.J. 525, 257 A.2d 698 (1969) (initiative
inconsistent with zoning procedures), over that of an earlier opinion, Meridian Dev. Co. v.
Edison Township, 91 N.J. Super. 310, 220 A.2d 121 (1966) (initiative process supersedes
inconsistent zoning procedures).
118. 125 N.J. Super. at 526, 312 A.2d at 157.
119. City council decisions on small-area rezonings can be made susceptible to meaningful
judicial review. This can be accomplished by requiring that the record reveal consideration of
appropriate factors, see, e.g., Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1970), or
by treating small-area rezonings as "administrative" matters subject to more intensive judicial
review of the factfinding process, see, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,
507 P.2d 23 (1973). See also Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The
Complementary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REv. 753 (1976).
On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of a way in which judicial review of a direct
legislation election could effectively ascertain the quality of decisionmaking except by deter-
mining whether the petitions triggering the election were valid and whether the proponents of
the initiative or referendum had complied with applicable state law regarding publicity.
120. 5 Misc. 2d 296, 163 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 4 App. Div. 761,165 N.Y.S.2d 709
(1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 836, 155 N.E.2d 404, 181 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).
121. 5 Misc. 2d at 301, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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On the surface, the result in Elkind appears questionable. The proposed
amendment would have added an "Office Building District" to the zoning
plan as a "floating zone." As such, it arguably represented both a policy
decision to use zoning as an incentive to attract businesses to the community
and a decision to require carefully tailored plans subject to governing board
approval at the map amendment stage. On the one hand, this appears to be
the type of decision that requires careful consideration and analysis of
various economic, social, geographic, and political factors in terms of the
application of a long range plan to specific land; according to cases such as
Spillane and Hancock, this type of decision should be reserved for the
official city decisionmaking agencies. On the other hand, the decision
presented by the Elkind floating zone ordinance is also one of general public
policy that would be appropriate for direct legislation. Significantly, it is
this type of zoning ordinance amendment that by definition is not subject to
-the neighborhood-protest extraordinary-majority requirement; 122 this sug-
gests that such an amendment is similar to nonzoning ordinance proposals
that, of course, are subject to the referendum.
Perhaps, however, the result in Elkind can be explained through a
better understanding of the underlying fact situation. The lawsuit challeng-
ing the referendum was brought by an owner of vacant land that, according
to the court, would qualify for reclassification under the terms of the
amendment.123 It is possible that the court implicitly recognized that the
referendum was not called to test public opinion on a major policy question,
but was instead responsive to a specific project proposed for particular land
in the city. Under these circumstances, the referendum proponents may have
been seeking a decision that was based not on policy or legislative facts, but
on facts of particular application.
This analysis of Elkind, although strained on the basis of the few facts
available in the opinion, is consistent with the idea that the values of
"comprehensive" planning in zoning cannot comfortably coexist with the
values of the direct legislation devices unless the standard for limiting the
use of direct legislation is the character of the factual determinations in-
volved in the amendment. There seems to be no reason to say that electors
are incompetent to answer the question, "Should New Rochelle seek to
122. Many zoning statutes provide a procedure for protest by those who own land within a
defined perimeter of the land directly affected by a map amendment. See note 23 and accom-
panying text supra. Because the original legislative creation of a "floating zone" does not
involve any particular land, such a protest procedure would be inapplicable. The neighborhood
protest procedure will generally be available, however, when the floating zone is "brought to
earth" in a map amendment.
123. 5 Misc. 2d at 297, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
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attract office buildings?" To conclude that respect for expertise and com-
prehensiveness dictates exclusive delegation of such questions to the city
governing body is to invest that political body and its creature, the planning
commission, with qualities of wisdom that experience suggests are not
available in large quantities. Such a conclusion also overlooks the fact that
use of the direct legislation devices does not preclude efforts of public
education by the "expert" bodies; indeed, in the case of a referendum, the
electoral process will follow public hearings and formal enactment of the
measure by the governing board. In short, there are few characteristics of
such a general policy question that make it unfit for plebiscite decision-
making.
Suppose, however, that the question for decision is, "Should Elkind's
land be rezoned to permit construction of office buildings?" or, to be more
realistic but less lawful, "should New Rochelle authorities permit Elkind to
construct his proposed office building?" This decision requires different
types of factual inquiry. An intelligent decision requires careful assessment
of the externalities likely to be associated with Elkind's proposal, the
relationship between those externalities and existing or proposed patterns of
land use in both the neighborhood and the larger community, and the social
and economic benefits likely to be derived from the project. Such a deci-
sion, concerned with particular facts-predictive to be sure, but often
ascertainable on the basis of comparable historical data-may not be made
as well by the voting public as by the official city decisionmakers. This
conclusion is not based on the assumption that official decisionmakers are
intrinsically more "expert" than voters, but rather on the perception that the
regular zoning decisionmaking process is better adapted or adaptable to this
type of factfinding than is the electoral process. This type of particularized
decision, no matter what its form, is more akin to an "administrative"
permit application decision than to a "legislative" decision.
The distinction between questions of general policy and questions of
the particular application of general policy is crucial to the development of
doctrine in this area if the values of direct legislation are to be meaningfully
accommodated with the values of fair and reasoned decisionmaking under-
lying typical zoning statutory schemes. Such a distinction is suggested by
section 65853 of the California Government Code. That statute requires that
ordinances imposing, removing, or modifying regulations be enacted in
accordance with typical zoning procedures, while other amendments to a
zoning ordinance may be enacted as all other ordinances are adopted,
including, presumably, by means of initiative and subject to referendum. 124
124. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
294 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:265
Although this statutory distinction may be irrelevant in California after
Associated Home Builders, the underlying principle of distinguishing types
of zoning amendment decisions on the basis of the required factual analysis
may explain opinions such as Taschner that limit the use of direct legisla-
tion by virtue of a compatibility theory articulated in terms of the required
"expertise" of the official public bodies that have a mandate to implement
"comprehensive" planning. This principle is articulated more directly,
however, in the cases that limit the use of direct legislation in zoning on the
basis of a characterization analysis.
B. CHARACTERIZATION ANALYSIS
The rule that direct legislation devices may be applied to "legislative" but
not to "administrative" matters is derived by some courts from constitution-
al or statutory text. 125 Other courts base the rule on state constitutional
history, which indicates that the direct legislation devices are intended for
questions of major policy, but not for questions of detail. 126 Still other courts
base the rule on a fear that, if applied to "administrative" activities, the
initiative and referendum will be used to harass and interfere with the
orderly operation of government. 127
Underlying this dichotomy in the zoning cases that disapprove the use
of direct legislation is a judgment that major questions of zoning policy are
suitable for plebiscite decisionmaking, while regulatory questions requiring
assessment of particular facts are not suited to resolution by election.
Decisions requiring particularized factfinding are also likely to be those in
which due process requires the affected persons to be given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, 128 which arguably is not available in an election
contest. 129
125. See, e.g., Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 321, 75 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1956); Comment,
Zoning by Initiative to Satisfy Local Electorates: A Valid Approach In California?, 10 CAL.
W.L. REV. 105, 121 (1975). In such cases, attention is paid to words such as "laws, .... stat-
utes," and "ordinances."
126. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 462-63, 221 N.W.2d 303, 304-05
(1974).
127. See, e.g., Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319,323-24,75 N.W.2d 713,716 (1956); Trautman,
Initiative and Referendum in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REv. 55, 86 (1973) (discussing
Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash. 2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972), in which the grant of an
unclassified use permit was considered an administrative act not subject to referendum).
128. See I K. DAVIs, ADmINISTRAnvE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 161-62 (3d ed. 1972). Compare
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Board of Equalization,
239 U.S. 441 (1915).
129. The California Supreme Court's opinion in San Diego, which held that procedural
due process did not apply to the adoption of "legislation" by initiative, see notes 76-78 and
accompanying text supra, precluded a majority of the supreme court from determining whether
the electoral process might constitute an adequate substitute for a more traditional due process
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Application of the administrative-legislative distinction to zoning
amendments requires courts to look through form to substance. An amend-
ment is formally an act of legislation. 130 Some courts have been unable or
unwilling to look beyond this form to find an "administrative" substance.
These courts conclude that, because the enactment of the original com-
prehensive zoning ordinance is a legislative act, any amendment to that
ordinance must also be legislative. 1 31 Courts have also been persuaded that,
if the essence of legislation is the adoption of a prospective rule of conduct,
rezonings that impose rules governing the future use of land must necessari-
ly be legislative. 132
Although some courts have adhered to the "legislative" label in
deciding zoning initiative and referendum disputes,1 33 several courts have
characterized rezonings as "administrative." In Kelley v. John,13 4 an action
to enjoin a referendum on a permissive amendment, the court stated that the
test for distinguishing legislative from administrative matters is whether the
government is "making a law"-legislative--or "executing or administer-
ing" laws already in existence-administrative.1 35 According to this defini-
tion, it might appear that most rezonings are "legislative," because such
hearing. The dissenters held that the initiative election campaign would not sufficiently fulfill
the constitutional requirement. In Taschner, the California Court of Appeal held that an
election campaign is not sufficient to satisfy procedural due process requirements. See notes
72-75 and accompanying text supra. In Hancock, a Texas court stated that a hearing cannot be
"meaningful" unless it is held before the body authorized to act, and that only the city
governing body was authorized to act on zoning amendments. See notes 109-12 and accompany-
ing text supra.
Due process might, however, require a hearing that is considerably less formal than the
typical adjudicative hearing. There is a suggestion in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), that in connection with
"proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards," due process will
require no more than the notice and hearing associated with "informal" rulemaking by the
federal regulatory agencies. Id. at 245; see id. at 240-46. Thus, in connection with a general
downzoning initiative such as that in San Diego, an election campaign might be constitutionally
satisfactory. Nevertheless, this approach still might not suffice in a dispute about a small-area
rezoning that more closely resembles an adjudicative process.
130. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
131. See, e.g., Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927); City of Coral Gables
v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
132. See, e.g., Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 538, 164
N.E.2d 180, 182, appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166 N.E.2d 924 (1960).
133. See, e.g., Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927); City of Fort Collins
v. Dooney, 178 Colo. 25, 496 P.2d 316 (1972); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d
404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972);
Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180, appeal
dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166 N.E.2d 924 (1960).
134. 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
135. Id. at 321, 75 N.W.2d at 715.
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amendments usually declare new rules of conduct.' 36 In Kelley, however,
the court simply asserted that changes in the classification of particular
parcels of land are part of the "administration" of the general zoning
ordinance. 137
In Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets, Inc. ,138 the Nevada
Supreme Court held that neither the initiative nor the referendum is available
in connection with particularized zoning decisionmaking. In addressing the
issue of the referendum, the court's rationale was similar to that of Kelley:
changes in the zoning scheme are "administrative" because subjecting such
matters to direct legislation would risk destroying the "uniformity necessary
to the accomplishment of the purposes of the comprehensive zoning ordi-
nance .... "139
One of the most recent characterization analysis opinions is that of
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Levin in West v. City of Portage.140
Portage was incorporated in 1963. In 1965 the city council adopted a
comprehensive zoning ordinance; between 1965 and early 1974 the council
amended the ordinance 128 times. 141 The 1974 litigation challenged a
referendum on an amendment rezoning 150 acres of land to permit a planned
unit development.
Three of the seven members of the Michigan court held the referendum
generally available in connection with rezonings, but found the particular
136. This reasoning may be too superficial. Reclassification amendments usually result
from a petition for relief by a landowner or developer who wishes to complete a development
project precluded by existing regulations. The rezoning decision is made with knowledge of the
project that probably will be undertaken when the rules are changed. Thus, a decision to rezone
is not a decision to change rules in the abstract, but a decision to provide relief from existing
rules to permit particular, identified conduct. Although the form of this decision is the adoption
of general rules for the land in question, the substance of the decision is the approval of
particular activity.
137. The court stated:
The policy of the municipality was determined by the adoption of the comprehensive
zoning ordinance. The administration of the ordinance, including the changes in
classification of particular pieces of property, very rarely affects all the electors of a
municipality. To say that administrative determinations are subject to referendum
could defeat the very purposes of zoning. The uniformity required in the proper
administration of a zoning ordinance could be wholly destroyed by referendum. ...
It would permit the electors. . . to change, delay, and defeat the real purpose of the
comprehensive zoning ordinance by creating the chaotic situation such ordinance was
designed to prevent.
162 Neb. at 323-24, 75 N.W.2d at 716.
138. 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973).
139. Id. at 538, 516 P.2d at 1237. The reasoning of Kelley and Forman is substantially
similar to that of the broader compatibility cases such as Taschner. See text accompanying
notes 72-75, 102-17 supra.
140. 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974).
141. Id. at 471, 221 N.W.2d at 309.
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referendum petition involved in West to be improper. 142 These judges used
a narrow compatibility analysis reminiscent of the California Supreme Court
in Johnston v. City of Claremont:143 the referendum is not inconsistent with
zoning pre-enactment procedures because those procedures are followed in
the enactment of the ordinance prior to calling the referendum. 144
Justice Levin wrote an opinion in which two of his colleagues joined, a
third joining in the result but not in the opinion. 145 The opinion first
142. This position was set forth in a concurring opinion written by Justice Williams in
which Justices T.M. Kavanagh and Swainson joined. Justice Williams' opinion found the West
referendum improper because the petition for the referendum also sought an initiative to rezone
80 of the 150 acres. Id. at 473, 221 N.W.2d at 310. The electors therefore sought not only to
reject the permissive amendment, but also the enactment of new regulations. Thus, even
though the concurring judges would have held a true referendum to be available on a permissive
rezoning, they were forced by Michigan precedent to hold that the "city clerk could not legally,
on the basis of the instant petition, put the requested referendum to the people." Id. at 478, 221
N.W.2d at 313.
143. 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958), disapproved by Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473,480 n.14, 135
Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 n.14 (1976); see note 98 supra.
144. 392 Mich. at 473-77, 221 N.W.2d at 310-12. The concurring opinion stated:
The aim of referendum is retention of the status quo existing prior to legislative
adoption of the amendatory zoning ordinance. The status quo was, again, achieved
through compliance with the statutory zoning enactment procedures. As a result,
referendum's aim of retention of the status quo does not conflict with the zoning-
enabling act's aim of guaranteeing certain procedural steps prior to the passage of new
zoning legislation.
Id. at 476, 221 N.W.2d at 312 (emphasis in original).
This is an attractive syllogism. Judges such as Justice Levin view it as unrealistic, however,
because it fails to recognize that the issue before both the governing body as it rezones and the
voters in the referendum is not the retention of the status quo per se, but whether to permit or
reject a change in regulations that will lead to the development of the land according to an
identified set of plans. From this perspective the referendum is not a decision favoring the
status quo, but is instead a decision against a particular development proposal. Thus, the
voters' return to the status quo is only incidental to a decision to reject the proposed devel-
opment. From the standpoint of the developer, the decision is a new zoning decision and not
simply a continuation of existing regulations.
145. Justice Levin's opinion in West is based on his concurring opinion in Kropf v. City of
Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974). In Kropf, the Michigan Supreme Court
reviewed a city council's refusal to rezone to permit multi-family development. The landowner-
developer sought a declaration that the existing single-family residential zoning was constitu-
tional. The majority treated the case in traditional terms; the court asked whether the single-
family residential classification was reasonable by inquiring whether some use might be made
of the land for the permitted purposes, and by independently considering whether the local
legislature's decision to exclude multi-family residences was arbitrary. Id. at 159-61, 215
N.W.2d at 187-89.
On its majority opinion alone, Kropf would be little more than another example of
traditionally deferential judicial review of zoning. Justice Levin's concurrence, however,
objected to the entire analysis adopted by his colleagues. Justice Levin asserted that zoning
decisionmaking is an administrative rather than a legislative process. He argued that decisions
based on broad grounds or general facts are legislative, while those based on individual grounds
or specific facts are administrative. Id. at 164, 166-67, 215 N.W.2d at 190, 190-92. He then
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overruled McKinley v. City of Fraser,146 a 1962 opinion holding that the
initiative is available for administrative as well as for legislative acts. Justice
Levin concluded that McKinley was wrong because the court did not
properly consider the meaning of the words "initiative" and "referendum"
in their historical context,147 and therefore failed to recognize that those
devices were intended only for matters "truly legislative in character." 148
The second stage in Justice Levin's analysis was to establish that "a
zoning amendment affecting particular property is an administrative, not a
legislative, act." ' 149 In support of this proposition, Justice Levin cited not
only other direct legislation cases, but also cases characterizing rezoning as
"administrative" in other contexts. 150
The supreme courts of Connecticut and Washington have also recently
used characterization analysis in holding that referenda are unavailable
for rezoning decisions. Although the Connecticut Supreme Court held in
O'Meara v. City of Norwich15' that zoning power had been vested exclu-
sively in the city council, 152 the court also stated that, in making zoning
decisions, the city council acts as a zoning commission and not in its general
described the typical zoning ordinance as a "specific" enactment that represents particularized
decisions. Id. at 167, 215 N.W.2d at 191-92.
Justice Levin's conclusion that the rezoning process is "administrative" became important
when the court considered the zoning referendum in West. Justice Levin's analysis in West
proceeds from the premise that tract rezoning is "administrative" to the conclusion that zoning
is not a fit subject for direct legislation.
For a thorough discussion of the status of Justice Levin's views in the Michigan Supreme
Court, see Cunningham, Reflections on Stare Decisis in Michigan: The Rise and Fall of the
"Rezoning as Administrative Act" Doctrine, 75 MICH. L. REv. 983 (1977); Cunningham,
Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New Look" in
Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REv. 1341 (1975).
146. 366 Mich. 104, 114 N.W.2d 341 (1962).
147. 392 Mich. at 461-62, 221 N.W.2d at 304.
148. Id. at 466, 221 N.W.2d at 306.
149. Id. at 468, 221 N.W.2d at 308. Justice Levin's conclusion that small-area rezonings are
administrative in nature is not surprising in view of his description of the zoning process in
Kropf:
The time has come . . . to cast aside old slogans and catchwords. For most
communities, zoning as long range planning based on generalized legislative facts
without regard to the individual facts has proved to be a theoretician's dream, soon
dissolved in a series of zoning map amendments, exceptions and variances-reflect-
ing, generally, decisions made on individual grounds-brought about by unanticipated
and often unforeseeable events ....
391 Mich. at 168, 215 N.W.2d at 191-92. See generally note 145 supra.
150. 392 Mich. at 468-72, 221 N.W.2d at 308-10.
151. 167 Conn. 579, 356 A.2d 906 (1975).
152. Id. at 583, 356 A.2d at 908. This rationale is similar to the exclusive-delegation
approach used in Scottsdale and Hancock. See notes 102-12 and accompanying text supra.
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legislative capacity.153 In Leonard v. City of Bothell, 154 the Washington
Supreme Court held that referenda are limited to legislative matters and that
the rezoning of a 141-acre tract was a quasi-judicial action.
The most interesting aspects of O'Meara and Leonard are the policy
justifications expressed by the courts. Echoing some of the compatibility
opinions,155 the O'Meara court stated that the zoning enactment procedures
are intended to assure that a zoning decision has been "fully and fairly
considered and is truly dictated by the public interest.- 15 6 Moreover, the
court noted that the procedures are designed to protect the rights of individu-
al property owners. 157 In Leonard, the Washington court asserted that
"[a]mendments to the zoning code or rezone decisions require an informed
and intelligent choice by individuals who possess the expertise to consider
the total economic, social, and physical characteristics of the communi-
ty."' 158 Implicit in these arguments, of course, is the idea that direct legisla-
tion cannot provide either intelligent or fair zoning decisionmaking. It is this
fundamental notion that zoning decisions differ from typical legislative
decisions and therefore require special procedures that lies at the heart of
both the characterization analysis opinions and the broader compatibility
cases that reject the use of direct legislation.
Characterization analysis has some real virtues: it does not depend
upon the vagaries of statutory draftsmanship or the changing standards of
due process law; 159 it applies to both the initiative and the referendum; and it
purports to distinguish between policy formulation and policy implementa-
tion. Unfortunately, none of the characterization opinions provides an ade-
153. 167 Conn. at 583, 356 A.2d at 909.
154. 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976).
155. See notes 49-124 and accompanying text supra.
156. 167 Conn. at 583, 356 A.2d at 908.
157. Id.
158. 87 Wash. 2d at 854, 557 P.2d at 1311.
159. There is some danger that the United States Supreme Court decision in City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), will be read as establishing a due
process entitlement to the use of direct legislation; such a reading would, however, be errone-
ous. See note 16 supra. In Eastlake, a permissive zoning amendment sought by a developer was
rejected in a referendum. Although the developer could have attacked the referendum on the
basis of a characterization analysis, the developer relied instead upon a due process limitation
on the delegation of zoning power to the electorate. On the authority of Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242
U.S. 526 (1917), and Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912), the Ohio Supreme Court
upheld the developer's constitutional argument. 426 U.S. at 671-72. The United States Supreme
Court found the Ohio court's reliance upon these cases to be misplaced, however, id. at 677-78,
and reversed the Ohio court's decision. Id. at 672. Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court's
due process discussion was somewhat limited to these rather outdated cases, Eastlake does not
foreclose all due process objections to direct legislation. Moreover, Eastlake certainly does not
affect the validity of the use of characterization analysis.
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quate articulation of the circumstances that give rise under state law to the
characterization of a zoning amendment decision as "administrative."
Thus, the major weakness of characterization analysis is that no court has
yet taken the opportunity carefully to define the situations in which the
analysis should be applied.
Nevertheless, some guidance can be drawn from the facts and results of
the characterization analysis cases. Each of the cases holding that direct
legislation is unavailable involved a small scale permissive or restrictive
rezoning. 1 60 Apparently the courts are responsive to the idea that small scale
rezonings require the application of stated or unstated policy criteria to
particularized and specific decisions, rather than the formulation of general
policy applicable to the community at large.
I. AN EVALUATION OF THE STATE LAW DOCTRINES
Judicial opinions resolving local government law issues too often substitute
labels or formalistic reasoning for analysis. This characteristic is particularly
evident in opinions restricting the use of direct legislation in zoning; it may
partially be explained by the sheer difficulty of writing opinions declaring
that voters may not make a decision about zoning-a matter perceived by
them to be well within their competence. 161 In disputes such as these, deeply
held democratic values, coupled with a popular and not unreasonable fear of
local government incompetence or corruption, compete with the less widely
understood values of coherent and reasoned decisionmaking that are among
the goals of most zoning procedures.
The tendency to decide these cases on the basis of artificial rationales
has had unfortunate effects. Some courts have unnecessarily restricted the
use of the initiative.62 Other courts have applied the narrow compatibility
160. Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976), involved the
rezoning of a 141-acre tract. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974),
involved the permissive rezoning of a 150-acre tract. Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs &
Markets, Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973), involved the permissive rezoning of a 3.5 acre
tract of land; the court's holding extended both to the referendum and to an initiative that,
although general in form, apparently was stimulated by the development proposal in question.
Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964), involved a referendum on a permissive
rezoning. The size of the tract is not indicated in the opinion. It appears from the opinion,
however, that the owner of the land had given a purchase option to intervenors in the lawsuit. It
is a fair inference that exercise of the option was contingent on rezoning and that the optionees
had a particular development scheme in mind. In Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713
(1956), the permissive amendment involved "Block 3, Kelley's Hilltop Addition to the City of
McCook, Nebraska." Id. at 320, 75 N.W.2d at 714.
161. See note I supra.
162. See, e.g., Laguna Beach Taxpayers' Ass'n v. City Council, 187 Cal. App. 2d 412, 9
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1960).
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analysis derived from Hurst to permit referenda in tract rezoning situations
where the necessity for and desirability of plebiscite decisionmaking are
questionable. 163 Some courts using a characterization approach have blindly
adhered to the "legislative" form of the amendment, permitting direct
legislation in equally questionable contexts.1 64
Because land use regulation problems will continue to generate public
concern and pressure for direct public participation, more satisfactory judi-
cial approaches to accommodating the values of comprehensive zoning with
those of direct legislation should be developed. 165 Rules governing the
resolution of these disputes should be reasonably certain in their application
and appropriately sensitive to the competing values.
The compatibility analysis is unsatisfactory in that it is both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive. Focusing upon the statutory pre-enactment proce-
dures too rigidly limits the use of the initiative in proposing amendments to
zoning ordinances because the pre-enactment procedures of the typical
zoning statute do not distinguish between different types of zoning amend-
ments. Under the compatibility analysis, however, those procedures will
even prevent using the initiative to propose zoning amendments that are
essentially statements of general public policy and as to which the pre-
enactment procedures probably are not needed. Focusing upon the pre-
enactment procedures also prevents intelligent consideration of the problems
presented by the referendum, a postenactment process. Here, the narrow
compatibility analysis found in Hurst mechanically permits referenda in a
context in which direct legislation may unnecessarily destroy attempts to
achieve coherent and fair zoning decisionmaking.
Even the broader compatibility analysis opinions-such as Hancock-
that are not so closely tied to the pre-enactment notice and hearing proce-
dures give too much attention to the statutory structure of the zoning process
163. See, e.g., Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1958). Presuma-
bly Johnston's rationale is now superseded by that of Associated Home Builders. See notes 79-
88 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
165. New Jersey now has a statute prohibiting direct legislation in connection with zoning
ordinance enactment or amendment. See note 117 supra. One suggestion for statutory treat-
ment of the problem of direct legislation in zoning may be found in Comment, supra note 125,
at 128-30. The proposed statute appears too cumbersome, however, and takes the Hurst
narrow-compatibility approach too seriously. The primary purpose of the proposal is to provide
mechanisms for notice and hearing; the proposal was drafted, however, prior to the San Diego
opinion.
Although the thrust of the discussion that follows in the text is devoted to judicial solutions
to these disputes, the set of rules suggested in the text accompanying notes 166-70 infra might
easily be reformulated in statutory form.
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and too little attention to characteristics of various types of zoning amend-
ments that might be relevant to the effective use of direct legislation. These
opinions refer to the values of comprehensive planning without analyzing
how those values are affected by the use of direct legislation in connection
with the particular amendment before the court.
The rationales articulated in the characterization analysis opinions are
little better. These opinions attempt to solve the problem through the
application of a deceptively simple rule, but make little or no attempt to
identify and consider factors that properly characterize a zoning decision as
"legislative" or "administrative." Instead, these labels become little more
than talismans for packaged results.
Although the results in many cases that prevent direct legislation in
tract-rezoning situations are correct, the characterization rationale probably
has reduced the number of such correct results. Judges are understandably
conscious that labels attached in one legal context are likely to be used in
other contexts without independent analysis. For example, to label a rezon-
ing situation "administrative" is to resolve the direct legislation question
against the use of direct legislation. Attaching the "administrative" label to
rezoning in the direct legislation context, however, might result in the
automatic use of that label to determine whether procedural due process or
the presumption of legislative validity should attach to such amendments.
Although the "administrative" label might be appropriate in all of these
contexts, such a judgment should be based on independent consideration of
the factors involved in each case.
Judicial assessment of disputes over the use of direct legislation in
connection with zoning amendments must be made with reference to two
goals. The first is to ensure that zoning decisions are made intelligently and
fairly. The second is to maximize citizen participation in government de-
cisionmaking through the initiative and referendum processes. Where the
achievement of both goals is impossible, judges must make a choice, which
frankly is a value choice, between the traditional zoning procedures and
direct legislation.
Most courts have resolved this choice in favor of the zoning procedures
and have then attempted to articulate a rationale for the choice in terms of
some rule of construction or through the application of labels. The general
tendency of the courts to hesitate in permitting direct legislation in the
zoning amendment process seems to be the proper value choice in the
absence of a statutory or constitutional command to the contrary. The
theoretical basis for this choice is a preference for fairness in the process of
altering the rights and privileges of individual landowners. Fairness requires
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informed and reasoned decisionmaking; in respect to some zoning amend-
ment decisions, there is reason to believe that the direct legislation proce-
dures do not provide adequate assurances of intelligent and fair decisions.
The historical basis for this choice is that traditional zoning procedures
reflect a built-in accommodation of both general public opinion and the
more intense view of the immediately affected "local" public. When
coupled with the regular representative electoral process and judicial re-
view, the traditional zoning process provides reasonable opportunity for
public participation in nearly all zoning amendment situations.
Effective as well as politically acceptable implementation of this value
choice requires that direct legislation devices be precluded where the zoning
issue has characteristics that suggest that the statutory devices attempting to
ensure intelligence and fairness are substantially implicated and find no
analogous substitute in direct legislation. Perhaps the easiest application of
such an approach is in connection with the enactment of an ordinance that
does no more than state community policy without providing for its im-
mediate implementation. Examples are ordinances instructing city officials
to develop an architectural control policy, a growth management policy, or a
plan for regulating the height of buildings. Such ordinances might techni-
cally become amendments to the existing zoning ordinance and, as such,
their enactment would be subject to the statutory notice and hearing proce-
dures. It should be noted, however, that such amendments by their very
nature would not call into play any statutory neighborhood protest procedure
because they would not implement regulations with respect to particular
land.166 Presumably, the intensity of citizen interest in such a proposal
would not vary on the basis of the direct or indirect effect of the regulation.
Additionally, any comprehensive-plan requirements of the statute would be
irrelevant because such ordinances would not immediately change the zon-
ing map or regulations. Public hearings would be useful in providing the
lawmakers with adequate exposure to relevant fact and opinion; neverthe-
less, enactment of these ordinances is unlikely to require findings or assess-
ments of particularized, historical facts for which trial-type hearings might
be appropriate. Instead, ordinances such as these are likely to be enacted on
the basis of value judgments based on impressions of the overall operation
of the city planning and regulatory process. These value determinations are
typical of purely legislative decisions, which traditionally have been subject
to direct legislation.
Tract or small-area rezoning decisions are quite different. These ordi-
nances are the most numerous type of zoning amendments and are among
166. See note 122 supra.
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those that generate the most intense public concern. In these decisions,
zoning pre-enactment procedures are quite important; here, direct legisla-
tion poses significant threats to values of intelligence and fairness.
The essential characteristic of a tract or small-area rezoning is that the
decision directly imposes, removes, or modifies regulations in the context of
a particular development proposal. 167 This has three consequences. The first
is that any such decision involves a question of fidelity to the comprehensive
plan, and thus calls upon the "expertise" of the local planning agency and
governing body. 168 The second is that an intelligent decisionmaker must
have command of the facts related to the particular situation: What is the
nature of the land in question? How do the present proposed regulations
affect the land use patterns and land values of the neighborhood? What are
the externalities associated with the newly permitted or restricted use? The
third consequence is that, because these are particularized and localized
implementation decisions, identified welfare transfers are unavoidable.
Within the area of the amendment's direct and indirect effects the intensity
of public concern is likely to be great, while interest in other sections of the
community may be minimal or nonexistent.
In such cases, an intelligent decision would seem to require a factfind-
ing and assessment process by persons who have developed some expertise
and who are conversant with the less obvious implications of the decision
for the community's overall planning effort. To the extent that particularized
facts are relevant, a somewhat formal hearing process would seem to be
essential to provide the basis for both intelligent decisionmaking and con-
comitant fairness to those affected by the decision. 169 Fairness also suggests
the desirability of a final decision by the representative governing body,
which not only has the capacity to account for the varying intensities of
public opinion, but which also is required by many zoning statutes to be
responsive to the expressed concerns of the immediate neighbors.
These characteristics of a small-area rezoning suggest that plebiscite
decisionmaking may not yield intelligent decisions and may result in deci-
sions that are unfair to the affected landowners. It seems unlikely that an
167. These verbs are used in California Government Code § 65853. See notes 62-65 and
accompanying text supra.
168. The "expertise" referred to is developed through experience in dealing with communi-
ty problems in the exercise of public responsibility, not through cocktail party conversation or
purely formal training.
169. Judicial utterances in some of the cases suggest that a hearing must either be entirely
adjudicative or entirely legislative. There is no reason, however, why a public hearing cannot be
conducted to include a factfinding component in addition to a component that emphasizes
opportunities for expression of general public information and opinion.
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electoral campaign for an initiative or referendum regarding such an ordi-
nance will yield a sufficiently certain public understanding of the facts
underlying the proposal or an appreciation of the impact of the change on the
overall community planning effort. 170 Moreover, to the extent that a small-
scale rezoning has an appreciable negative impact on the value of identifi-
able parcels of land, fairness would suggest the desirability of a factfinding
process that either approximates an adjudicative decision or is at least
amenable to a form of judicial review based on a record. If direct legislation
is used to effect or prevent a small-area rezoning, many of the decisionmak-
ing voters are likely to have an intense interest-based partly on econom-
ics-in the outcome; the specific beneficiaries of a welfare transfer may be
in a position to force the transfer.
Finally, small-scale rezoning decisions are hardly the type of govern-
mental decision for which the direct legislation devices were designed.
These rezonings rarely involve statements of general public policy; such
decisions implement rather than declare policy, and often do so in a context
where the citizens most directly affected are accorded special rights of
participation in the representative decisionmaking process. On balance, the
small-scale rezoning decision appears to be one in which a choice should be
made against the use of the direct legislation devices; a contrary result
threatens important societal values without a significant countervailing
benefit.
The most difficult case to assess is the zoning ordinance enactment that
imposes, relieves, or modifies land use regulations, but does so with respect
to such a large class of situations that it can also fairly be said to represent a
significant statement of general public policy. Examples are the adoption of
the comprehensive zoning ordinance in Hurst and the coastal-zone height
restriction in San Diego. There is little doubt that direct legislation would be
appropriate if the questions were "Should Burlingame have comprehensive
zoning?" or "Should San Diego restrict intensive development in its coastal
area?" When such questions involve the actual implementation of the
broader policy, however, a choice in favor of direct legislation becomes less
obvious.
In the evaluation of cases in this context, it is useful to remember that
the political values inherent in direct legislation can be achieved, albeit
170. Note, supra note 7, is a useful discussion of the operation of direct legislation at the
state level. The author discusses the problem of voter understanding with reference to the
complexity of many initiative measures and the nature of the political campaigns waged in favor
of initiatives. Id. at 934-39. It seems unlikely that local initiative measures and political
campaigns will yield greater public understanding than is provided by state initiative processes.
See note 91 supra.
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much less directly, through the regular political process; representatives can
be defeated for re-election and ordinances can be repealed.17 1 Moreover,
where zoning implementation decisions are made by the electorate without
consideration by the planning board and without the public hearing process
that helps the decisionmaker evaluate fact and opinion, the damage may be
more difficult to repair. This is most likely in situations where the relevant
rules make repeal of an initiative ordinance impossible without another
initiative.
Although the choice is difficult, the appropriate result may be to
preclude use of the initiative in these cases on the ground that zoning
implementation decisions are more likely to be rational and fair if made
through the traditional "official" processes. Where the question is one of
public pressure for the enactment of legislation, this pressure can be accom-
modated through the normal processes of representative government.
This attempt to resolve the question without resorting to formalism
does not rely upon requirements of procedural due process. Thus, the
initiative is inappropriate in cases such as San Diego even where it is not
precluded by procedural due process. Because this approach is not tied to
any external concept such as due process, "administrative" or "legisla-
tive" characterizations, or the presence of certain zoning statute procedures,
it may be thought to be too flexible and thus insufficiently useful to guide
local officials and attorneys in planning and counseling. In essence, how-
ever, the resulting rule is simply that the initiative and referendum should
not be permitted where the immediate impact of the zoning amendment is
the imposition, removal, or modification of regulations.
171. Of course here is the rub. Failure to adopt a restrictive ordinance by initiative or to
invalidate a permissive amendment by referendum will likely result in actual land devel-
opment-unwanted by the proponents of the direct legislation; and once the development
occurs, certain rights will vest. It is, therefore, not entirely satisfactory to contend that the
regular representative processes will solve the problems of the "no-growth" advocates. The
greatest difficulty of course arises in cases where a permissive amendment is sought and
granted for a particular development project. But it is in these cases that the typical zoning
procedures adopt a workable compromise: public opinion can be expressed at one or more
hearings, and the intense opinion of neighboring landowners is accommodated through an
extraordinary majority requirement.
